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INTRODUCTION

During much of its history, the International Law Commission ("ILC")
primarily finalized its work in the form of draft conventions or draft articles
with an eye to their negotiation and adoption as treaties, although it did also
release soft law' documents such as principles and draft declarations.

Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Thanks to the participants in the FIU Law
Review 70th Anniversary Celebration Symposium, and particularly to Danae Azaria and Charles Jalloh
for their assistance and insights, as well as to the FIU Law Review editors.
1

ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 196 (2d ed. 2005) ("Soft law" is "a body of standards,

commitments, joint statements, or declarations ofpolicy or intention...."). There is an extensive literature
on the definition, scope, and legitimacy of soft law, as well as its implications for international law regimes
and international relations. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, InternationalSoft Law, 2
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 173 (2010) (defining soft law as "a continuum, or spectrum, running between
fully binding treaties and fully political positions."); Kal Raustiala &Anne-Marie Slaughter, International
Law, InternationalRelations, and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 540, 551

(Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002) (defining soft law as "instruments or rules that have some indicia of
international law but lack explicit and agreed legal bindingness."); Dinah Shelton, Soft Law, in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68, 69 (David Armstrong ed., 2008) (defining soft law

as "a type of social rather than legal norm.... [including] any written instrument, other
containing principles, norms, standards, or other statements of expected behavior.");
Klabbers, The Redundancy of Soft Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 167 (1996) (critiquing soft
instruments which are to be considered as giving rise to legal effects, but do not (or not
amount to real law.").

than a treaty,
see also Jan
law as "those
yet, perhaps)
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However, since the 1990s, the ILC has increasingly produced soft law; even
when it has released draft articles, it has not always sought to have those draft
articles immediately considered for adoption as a convention. Thus, over
time, the balance of the ILC's work product has transitioned from being
predominantly oriented toward development of hard law 2 to predominantly
comprising soft law, although it has continued to include both.3
Scholars assessing the work of the ILC between 2008 and 2015
commented on this change in the ILC's practice. According to their analysis,
this shift represented an appropriate acquiescence in a general global trend
away from a preference for hard law norms enshrined in treaties and toward
soft law norms that are more susceptible of gradual development,
interpretation, and evolution. They also characterized this new strategy as a
reaction specifically to the failure of some conventions developed from the
ILC's draft articles to secure substantial numbers of ratifications, and to
repeated United Nations General Assembly ("UNGA") reluctance to
negotiate treaties based on the ILC's draft articles and recommendations. All
in all, the scholarly consensus was that the transition toward soft law could
revive the ILC's relevance in the face of declining state interest in developing
multilateral treaties as a mode of global law-making.
Since then, this soft law trend has continued. Between 2016 and 2018,
the ILC finalized three soft law works: a Final Report of the Study Group on
the Most-Favored Nation Clause, Draft Conclusions on Subsequent
Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of
Treaties, and Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International

2

See Gregory Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard and Soft Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY

PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 197, 198 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff&

Marka A. Pollack, eds., 2012). In contrast to soft law, hard law is understood to impose legally binding
obligations; treaties are a quintessential example of hard law. Id.
3 Jacob Katz Cogan, The Changing Form of the InternationalLaw Commission's Work, in
EVOLUTIONS IN THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 275, 277-78 (Roberto Virzo & Ivan

Ingravallo, eds., 2015) (noting only one instance of the ILC producing draft articles and recommending
that the UNGA use them as the basis for treaty negotiation between 1999 and 2015); Michael Wood, The
GeneralAssembly and the InternationalLaw Commission: What Happens to the Commission's Work and
Why?,

in INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND FRAGMENTATION:

FESTSCHRIFT IN

HONOUR OF GERHARD HAFNER 373, 376, 378-79 (Isabelle Buffard et al., eds., 2008) (noting two instances

of the ILC producing draft articles and recommending that the UNGA use them as the basis for treaty
negotiation between 1999 and 2008); see also Sean D. Murphy, Codification, ProgressiveDevelopment,
or Scholarly Analysis? The Art of Packaging the ILC's Work Product, in THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR IAN BROWNLIE 29, 34-35 (Maurizio

Ragazzi ed., 2013).
4 Cogan, supra note 3, at 286; Murphy, supra note 3, at 33-34; Wood, supra note 3, at 377 (noting
instances in which the Sixth Committee has not followed the Commission's recommendations); see also
Kristina Daugirdas, The InternationalLaw Commission Reinvents Itself?, 108 AM. J. INT'L L. UNBOUND

79, 79 (2014).
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Law.' In that timeframe, it concluded only one product intended for
disposition as hard law, the Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the
Event of Disasters, which it recommended be considered for a convention.
Of the topics that make up the ILC's pending work in progress, most are
being pursued as soft law projects. 7
This essay explores the implications of the ILC's transition toward a
greater emphasis on soft law. It first argues that soft law is an effective
vehicle for the ILC's mission of codifying and progressively developing
international law, and that, likewise, the ILC is well-structured to produce
soft law. It then observes that the ILC's soft law has in fact been influential
on an audience of diverse global legal actors. Finally, it contends that the ILC
can best serve its core purposes by recognizing this widespread soft law
audience and taking steps to engage with it more robustly.
II.

THE ILC AND SOFT LAW

While there is considerable debate about the exact nature of the
distinction between hard law and soft law," for purposes of this article
focusing on the work product of the ILC, what is most significant is the
difference in the forms and in the approval processes for hard law and soft
law outputs. In the ILC context, hard law constitutes treaties that are
negotiated and ratified on the basis of draft articles produced by the ILC. In
contrast, soft law may be issued in several formats, including draft articles
not recommended for conversion to a treaty, principles, guidelines, and so
on. There is no negotiation or ratification process for the ILC's soft law,
although there are multiple opportunities for state input and the ILC does
typically request that the UNGA endorse its soft law work. Also important to

5 Int'l
Law
Comm'n,
Texts,
Instruments,
and
Final
Reports,
U.N.,
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/texts.shtml (last updated Aug. 30, 2018).
6 Id. The draft articles and this recommendation are currently under consideration by the Sixth
Committee.
7 Its work on protection of the atmosphere and provisional application of treaties are being
developed in the form of draft guidelines; its work on peremptory norms is being developed in the form
of draft conclusions; and its work on protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts is being

developed as draft principles. Sean D. Murphy, Anniversary Commemoration and Work of the
InternationalLaw Commission's Seventieth Session, 113 AM. J. INT'L L. 90, 96-104 (2019). The topics

of succession of states in respect of state responsibility and immunity of state officials from foreign
criminal jurisdiction are being developed into draft articles and so could be finalized either with or without
recommendations for adoption as conventions. Id. at 104-06; Sean D. Murphy, CrimesAgainstHumanity
and Other Topics: The Sixty-Ninth Session ofthe InternationalLaw Commission, 111 AM. J. INT'L L. 970,
981-88 (2017). One current initiative, the Draft Articles on Crimes against Humanity, has been expressly
designated as being produced with an eye to adoption as a treaty. Id. at 970-71.
8

See supra notes 1-2.

10 10

FIULaw Review

[Vol. 13:1007

this analysis is the extent and nature of various global actors' reliance on the
ILC's soft law, discussed in detail below.
The functions of soft law overlap considerably with the ILC's
commitment to contribute to the codification and progressive development
of international law. 9 While soft law norms "do not impose legally binding
obligations," they "may . .. lay the ground, or constitute the building blocks,
for the gradual formation of customary rules or treaty provisions." 0
Furthermore, under some circumstances, soft law "may be regarded as
declaratory, or indicative, of a customary rule, or instead as helping to
crystallize such a rule."" Soft law may also help to shape state practice, or to
direct decisionmakers', scholars', and advocates' attention in such a way as
to encourage constructive development of the law. In addition, "secondary
soft law" interprets and applies existing hard law.1 2 Increasingly, actors in the
global community have treated soft law norms as persuasive authority.1 3
As such, apart from the aforementioned pragmatic considerations about
the likelihood that the UNGA will proceed on and states will ratify a proposed
convention, there are numerous substantive reasons that the ILC might deem
a soft law format to be the most effective way for it to serve its function of
codifying and progressively developing international law with regard to a
particular topic at a particular time. 1 I highlight here several factors that
relate directly to the nature of soft law, and in particular, to the overlap of
soft law's role in enabling the evolution of international law with the core

.

9 While article 15 of the ILC statute linked its progressive development function to hard law, in
the form of creation of a draft convention, and its codification function to soft law, in the form of other
types of outputs, that lockstep connection has lapsed with the partial collapse of the distinction between
progressive development and codification itself. Wood characterizes the previous tendency to default to
treaties as the mode of encapsulating the ILC's work as "a hangover from the 'codification movement' .
. , a limited view of what 'codification' involved, and a particular view of the advantages of treaty law
over customary international law." Wood, supra note 3, at 383. The ILC determines what form its work
will take on a case by case basis, without indicating whether it considers a particular project or particular
provisions to be progressive development or codification.
10 Cassese, supra note 1, at 196.
11 Cassese contends that this analysis should be the same whether assessing a principle enshrined
in soft law or a principle generally. Id. at 196-97.
12 Shelton, supra note 1, at 70 ("Secondary soft law includes the recommendations and general
comments of international supervisory organs, the jurisprudence of courts and commissions, decisions of
special rapporteurs and other ad hoc bodies, and the resolutions of political organs of international
organizations applying primary norms. Most of this secondary soft law is pronounced by institutions
whose existence and jurisdiction is derived from a treaty and who apply norms contained in the same
treaty.").
13 Wood, supra note 3, at 381 (noting the soft law functions served by the Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts).
14 Michael Wood suggests a series of relevant factors, including those listed here and others. Id.
at 383-84.
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functions of the ILC. In addition, as discussed at the end of this list, just as
these can be understood as reasons that the ILC might elect a soft law format
to encapsulate its norms, these considerations also suggest reasons that the
ILC is particularly well-suited as an institution to produce soft law.'
A.

Advantages of Soft Law for the ILC's Mission

One factor is the maturity of the existing international law on the topic.
In areas of law that are still evolving, adoption of a convention might be
premature from the perspective of legal development, as it would not allow
for continued modification of the norms through practice. 6 Soft law also
provides a more flexible environment for states to implement and adapt
nascent norms on a case-by-case basis. In such instances, the ILC can use
soft law to codify existing norms and promulgate others in the spirit of
progressive development, without halting the development process or
discouraging engagement by states.' 7
Relatedly, principles, guidelines, and other such alternative formats also
tend to make space for the ILC to address norms that are at different stages
of stability and consensus.' Several scholars have noted that the draft articles
format may tend to suggest that all the articles are equally well-established
as customary international law, even if there is a range of consensus on
various articles; this is both because of the expectations created by the use of
that format and because such articles are by their nature declaratory in tone.19
In contrast, other formats allow for a broader range of expressed certainty in
the tone of various provisions and may invite further analysis and adaptation.
For example, the ILC's Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties was

15 There is an extensive literature concerning the reasons states might prefer soft law to hard law
and the relevant theories of international law and international relations. See, e.g., Alan E. Boyle, Some
&

Reflections on the Relationship ofTreaties and Soft Law, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 901 (1999); Guzman

&

Meyer, supra note 1; Klabbers, supra note 1; Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 550-5 1; Shaffer
Dunoff, supra note 2, at 202-07. Here, I focus on incentives for the ILC as an institution that is committed
to effective international legal development.
16 Wood, supranote 3, at 383-84.
17 In contrast, the currently pending Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity, which are
expected to be recommended for development into a treaty, represent a mature topic well-suited to a hard
law format. There have now been several decades of prosecutions of this crime, which is accordingly wellestablished and is also generally accepted. In addition, international criminal law scholars and advocates
have long called for a treaty defining crimes against humanity, to put it on an equal footing with the other
core international crimes of genocide and war crimes and to avoid fragmentation in the definition of this
crime by the many international, hybrid, and national courts that hear such cases. See, e.g., FORGING A
CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2011).

18
19

Daugirdas, supra note 4, at 80.
Id. at 79-80; Murphy, supra note 3, at 34-35.
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characterized by the ILC as a "toolbox," which suggests opportunities for
states to pick and choose among its guidelines; the Guide also contains
recommendations concerning best practices that are framed as suggestions
rather than requirements. 2 0 Thus, while draft articles do represent soft law if
relied on in their own right rather than serving as the basis for a treaty, soft
law also offers a range of alternative forms that may present expressive
advantages. 2
A third reason is that the process of negotiating and ratifying a treaty
may be detrimental to the quality or perceived legitimacy of the concerned
norms. The ILC's work and its end products are primarily shaped by an
interest in the law as such, in its role as an expert body. Since the process of
negotiating a treaty will inevitably be driven at least in part by national
interests, changes introduced during those negotiations may not be
improvements from a legal development perspective, but rather may reflect
political compromises. In addition, if the treaty does not gamer many
ratifications, that public demonstration of a lack of support may undermine
the perceived legitimacy of the concerned norms. Thus, if the quality or
perceived legitimacy of the norms would be at risk during atreaty negotiation
process, a soft law format that can stand on its own merits may be the better
option.22

In contrast, rather than serving as an alternative to a treaty, secondary
soft law functions as a mechanism for elaborating on existing hard law. For
example, the ILC's recent soft law project producing Draft Conclusions on
Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the
Interpretation of Treaties elaborates on its previous hard law project
developing draft articles that became the Vienna Convention on Treaties.2 3

20 Daugirdas, supra note 4, at 81.
21 While I have framed this question as one of effective expression and degrees of stability or
consensus, this consideration has also been framed as one of distinguishing between codification and
progressive development. The ILC does not typically specify which provisions it deems to be progressive
development and which it deems codification, although it has done so at times in its commentaries.
Daugirdas, supra note 4, at 79-80; Murphy, supra note 3, at 34-35. This distinction is often unclear in
practice, and there are pros and cons to such signaling. In my view, this consideration is not about
categorizing provisions as codification or progressive development, nor about determining their relative
authority, but rather about accurately conveying the current stability and scope of norms and appropriately
encouraging further adaptation and development of those norms.
22 This concern has been repeatedly raised by states when considering whether to open
negotiations to develop draft articles into a convention. Wood, supra note 3, at 381 (discussing the reasons
for the United Kingdom's resistance to negotiating a convention); U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility
of Statesfor InternationallyWrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/71/79, at 2, 4, 7-8 (April 21, 2016) (comments

of Australia, Finland, and the United Kingdom).
23 See Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent
Practices in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 (2018); Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft
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Several other ongoing ILC soft law projects also interpret this convention.
In this context, using a soft law format avoids any risk of perceived conflict
with the binding terms of the treaty.
A final factor is that the implementation of international law norms often
depends on an internalization of those norms into state bureaucracies and
private institutions, and on the decisions of the many actors that carry out
those norms to align policies and practices with them. While this may occur
top-down after ratification of a treaty, it may also develop bottom-up, as onthe-ground actors identify soft law norms as useful in guiding their work and
ascertain how best to adapt and implement them in their contexts. Thus, soft
law allows for decisions about whether and how implementation should be
carried out to be made by the expert practitioners who do the concerned work,
rather than by political actors who are focused on political aims and are not
necessarily experts in the work at hand. It also allows for the eventual
evolution of the norms based on that bottom-up practice. 2 5
These considerations reflect several interconnected realities that make
soft law a valuable mechanism for the ILC's purposes of codification and
progressive development of international law, and in many instances a more
appropriate format than a treaty. First, when international law norms develop
in an evolutionary fashion, they do so in contexts that may be predominantly
legal, bureaucratic, or action-oriented, rather than in predominantly political
contexts, and this may be to their benefit. Second, hard law products titrate
norms through the political processes of negotiation and ratification; soft law
products allow for the possibility of testing the norms in use before, or instead
of, subjecting them to evaluation by political elites. As such, both political
considerations and legal development considerations suggest that
recommendation of a treaty should only occur at the right moment, when
further evolution is not desired, when fragmentation is feared, and when

Articles on the Law of Treaties (1966); see also Shelton, supra note 1, at 70 (discussing secondary soft
law).

24 See, e.g., Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/69/10,
annex at 274-82 (2014); Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/66/10, annex III, at 199-201 (2011).
25

See

generally EMANUEL

ADLER,

COMMUNITARIAN

INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS:

THE

EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 13-26 (2005); Elena Baylis, Reassessing the

Role ofInternationalCriminal Law: Rebuilding National Courts Through TransnationalNetworks, 50
B.C. L. REV. 1, 67-68 (2009); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International
Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998); Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International
Lawmaking: The Tale ofThree Trade FinanceInstruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125, 128-29 (2005). This

is not to say, of course, that there will be no political considerations at play in the determination of whether
and how to implement those norms on the ground, but rather, that those decisions may be made in a
bureaucratic or action-oriented context, rather than in a political context.
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political interests favor the concerned norms.26 When this is not the case,
seeking a treaty would be unwise, and a soft law structure will better
contribute to the development of international law. Finally, as discussed
further below, the advantages that hard law has over customary law or
developing legal norms are diminished by the act of crystallizing soft law in
a singular, written form. Then, the distinction becomes a matter of authority
and durability, rather than clarity or accessibility.
B.

InstitutionalAdvantages of the ILCfor ProducingSoft Law

Just as soft law is often an effective mechanism for the ILC's aims, so
the ILC is also particularly well-suited as an institution to produce soft law.
Its structure, work processes, and expertise amplify the benefits of soft law
and offset its weaknesses. Hard law gains its authority through explicit state
agreement; soft law must gain adherents through its utility, credibility, and
persuasive value.
The ILC has the resources and established work processes to enable it
to research and consolidate widely dispersed examples of state practice, court
decisions, and other evidence of customary law or developing legal norms,
to draft those norms in concise and precise terms, and to produce nuanced
commentaries explaining and documenting its findings and conclusions.
Further, a defining feature of the ILC's work process is its direct and robust
engagement with states, which have the opportunity not only to provide
information to the ILC, but also to discuss its drafts in the Sixth Committee
and to provide written comments; this debate and commentary is considered
and incorporated by the concerned Special Rapporteur and Drafting
Committee in developing a final draft of the eventual product. Thus, while
the ILC's soft law products do not have the explicit agreement of states, they
do possess the imprimatur of states' consideration, analysis, and input.
In addition to its work processes, the ILC's known expertise and
longstanding reputation lend credibility to its work product. In considering
the ILC's role, Watts noted that "[o]n particular topics the authority which
underlies [the ILC's] work . .. has been influential in consolidating the law:
and more generally, its intellectual approach to establishing coherent bodies
of rules in different areas has given an overall solidarity to international law
which was previously lacking." 27 Finally, the ILC's regular reporting on its
work in its yearbooks and public engagement with the Sixth Committee
26 Wood, supra note 3, at 381 ("[I]t is difficult to see what would be gained by the adoption of a
convention. The [Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts] were already
proving their worth and were entering the fabric of international law through State practice, decisions of
courts and tribunals and the writings of publicists.").
27 Id. at 383.
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provides a degree of transparency, which is further amplified by the analysis
in its commentaries.
In particular, through its deployment of these resources, expertise and
transparency, the ILC's soft law outputs render customary and developing
norms distinct and readily accessible to potential users, as distinct and as
accessible as hard law. In general, "[t]reaties are often clearer and more stable
than the rules of customary law, or at least thought to be so."28 However, in
instances in which the ILC has consolidated customary law or emerging legal
norms in a singular, written form, this soft law product is likely to be just as
exact and certain as a treaty. In this way, the ILC's soft law texts are distinct
from customary law and other norms that have not been so codified.
Accordingly, courts, bureaucrats, NGOs, and others considering matters to
which the concerned norms are relevant may find the ILC's articulation of
those norms renders those norms more immediately useful.
The ILC's involvement also facilitates a dynamic relationship between
hard law and soft law over time. Because it has the ability to return to
different aspects of topics at different moments, its soft law norms can more
readily be developed into new hard law, or alternatively, it can deploy new
soft law to elaborate on prior hard law. 2 9 As such, it can consider its global
audience's response to its work and then respond by leveraging whichever
form will most effectively promote its mission of developing international
law. In addition, its robust engagement with states and the UNGA's
endorsement of its soft law ameliorate somewhat the distinction between hard
law to which states have directly acceded and soft law to which they have
not, by offering its audience the assurance that states have at least thoroughly
considered and weighed in on the concerned soft law norms. Thus, rather
than forming sharply contrasting alternatives with distinctly differing results,
the ILC's hard law and soft law can be seen as intersecting, interactive, and
interrelated. 30

28
Wood, supra note 3, at 384. Another distinction between treaties and customary law that is not
addressed by the ILC's work is their status in domestic law, which is significant before national courts.
Id.
29 For example, the ILC issued the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts as soft law without recommending they be adopted as a convention. Since then, the UNGA
has repeatedly sought reports on tribunals' use of the draft articles and state comments on their view of
the articles, with an eye to their potential future negotiation as a convention. G.A. Res. 71/133 (Dec. 13,
2016); G.A. Res. 68/204 (Dec. 16, 2013); G.A. Res. 65/19 (Dec. 6, 2010); G.A. Res. 62/61 (Dec. 6, 2007);
G.A. Res. 59/35 (Dec. 2, 2004). In addition, as discussed above, the ILC is currently considering several
topics relating to the Vienna Convention on Treaties.
30 Compare Klabbers, supra note 1 (sharply distinguishing hard law and soft law), with Shelton,
supra note 1, at 68 ("The distinction [between hard law and soft law] may not be as significant as expected
1)
...

10 16

FIULaw Review

[Vol. 13:1007

III. THE ILC's SOFT LAW INFLUENCE AND AUDIENCE

A.

Influence

If the ILC's shift toward soft law is indeed increasing its relevance in its
core role of codifying and progressively developing international law, we
would expect to see signs that its soft law offerings are in fact influencing
legal actors. This influence might be seen in a variety of contexts, such as in
citations from decision-makers like courts, arbitration panels, and treaty
bodies; in scholars' analysis; in the policies and practices of governmental
and intergovernmental organizations; in the advocacy carried out by NGOs;
in informal circulation through network and community connections; and of
course, in formal circulation by the UNGA through resolutions of support or
other actions. By their nature, some of these uses are more readily observed
than others. In particular, citations in published decisions and scholarship are
publicly available, whereas institutional practice and informal circulation are
impossible to access except through interviews or participant observation
within the concerned organizations.
Several empirical studies suggest that the ILC's soft law is widely
publicly cited. Danae Azaria's study of the International Court of Justice's
citation of ILC documents and commentaries has found extensive ICJ
reliance on the ILC's work.31 Similarly, a study of investment tribunal awards
in 2009 found that ILC rules, including soft law, were treated as evidence of
customary law by such tribunals.32 In addition, at the request of the UNGA,
the UN Secretary-General has produced a report on citations to the Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (which
the ILC did not recommend be developed into a convention and so are cited
in their own right as soft law). The most recent version of this report lists 159
citations to the Draft Articles by a variety of courts, tribunals, and
commissions, including by:
the International Court of Justice; the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea; the WTO Appellate Body;
international arbitral tribunals; the African Court on Human
and Peoples' Rights; the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights; the European Court of Human Rights; the
31 Danae Azaria, The Working Methods of the InternationalLaw Commission: Adherence to
Methodology, Commentaries and Decision-Making, in 70 YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
CoMMIssioN-DRAWING A BALANCE FOR THE FUTURE, at 4-5 (forthcoming 2019) (draft on file with

author) (finding that the ICJ has relied on ILC sources in 22 cases to address 39 legal questions).
32 Moshe Hirsch, Sources of International Investment Law 12 (July 21, 2011) (unpublished
research paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1892564 (citing awards that themselves cite ILC soft law).
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Inter-American Court of Human Rights; and the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon.33
Furthermore, even a selective search of publicly available documents
unearths many examples of use of ILC soft law by courts, treaty bodies,
states, scholars, and others. Concerning the above-mentioned Draft Articles
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, James
Crawford has observed that:
States as well as non-State litigants are increasingly relying
on the articles and commentaries, and international courts
and tribunals are treating them as a source on questions of
State responsibility. 3 4
In addition to the courts and tribunals listed above, the Draft Articles have
also been cited by the World Bank,3 5 parties before the United Nations
Human Rights Committee, 36 the United Nations Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,37 and various scholars,3 8 among others.39

33 U.N. Secretary General, ResponsibilityofStatesfor InternationallyWrongfulActs, Compilation
ofDecisionsofInternationalCourts, Tribunals and Other Bodies, U.N. Doc A/71/80, at 5 (2016).
34

James R Crawford, State Responsibility, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L LAW,

http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1093
September 2006).
35

(last updated

SIOBHAN MCINERNEY-LANKFORD ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: A REVIEW

OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DIMENSIONS 24 (2011).

36 Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Comm. Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional
Protocol to the Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Concerning Communication No. 2022/2011,
CCPR/C/1 13/D/2022/201 1, annex at 5 n.7 (Aug. 20, 2015).
37 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Views Adopted by the Comm. at Its Sixty-Second
Session, Concerning Commc'nNo. 14/2016, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/62/D/14/2016, at 13 n. 12, (Dec. 19, 2017)
[hereinafter Views Concerning Commc'n No. 14/2016]; Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights,
Views Adopted by the Comm. under the Optional Protocol to the Int'l Covenant on Econ., Soc. and
Cultural Rights, Concerning Commc'n No. 4/2014, ¶ 6.7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/59/D/4/2014 (Nov. 24, 2016)
[hereinafter Views Concerning Commc'n No. 4/2014].
38

Benoit Mayer, ObligationsofConduct in the InternationalLaw on Climate Change:A Defence,

REV. EuR., COMP. & INT'L ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 10 n.87) (available
at https://ssm.com/abstract=3156067); Jesse L. Reynolds, An Economic Analysis of Liability and
Compensationfor Harm from Large-Scale Solar Climate EngineeringFieldResearch in Solar Climate

Engineering, 5 CLIMATEL. 182, 199 n.33 (2015), https://ssm.com/abstract=2630934; Charles-Emmanuel
Ctd, From Sea to Sea: Regulatory Space of Federal and Provincial Governments in Canada Under CETA
and TPP Investment Chapters 14 n.94 (July 18, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
https://ssm.com/abstract=2857148).
39 See also Donald K. Anton The PrincipleofResidualLiability in the Seabed Disputes Chamber
ofthe InternationalTribunalfor the Law ofthe Sea: The Advisory Opinion on Responsibility and Liability
for InternationalSeabedAMining (ITLOS Case No. 1 7), 7 MCGILL INT'L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y,

241, 251 n.45 (citing The M/V "Saiga" (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Judgment of July 1,
1999, ITLOS Rep. 1999, 10, ¶f 169-71 (applying "article 42, paragraph 1, of the Draft Articles of the
International Law Commission on State Responsibility .... ); Crawford, supra note 34 (noting citations
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Other soft law products are also influential. The Draft Principles on the
Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of
Hazardous Activities have been cited by International Court of Justice parties
and judges 0 and by entities participating in a case before the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 4 ' and have been discussed by environmental
law scholars.42 The Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the
Fragmentation of International Law have been cited by states parties before
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,4 3 by
states parties before the European Court of Human Rights, by the Eureopean
Court of Human Rights itself,4 and by others.45 Other soft law documents
issued by the ILC have also been extensively cited and discussed.
by ICSID and other investment tribunals, WTO arbitral panels, and other courts and tribunals previously
mentioned).
40
Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) and
Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), Judgment, 2015
I.C.J. Rep. 665, ¶ 190 (Dec. 16); Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa
Rica v. Nicar.) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica),
2015 I.C.J. Rep. 665, 3 nn.10 & 13, 5 n.23, 6 nn.28-30 (Dec. 16) (separate opinion by Bhandari, J.),
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/150/18860.pdf.
41 Anton, supra note 39, at 17-18 (citing submissions by the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature and Stichting Greenpeace Council).
42

PHILLIPPE SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 710 (2012);

Reynolds, supra note 38, at 202, 207; Caroline E. Foster, The ILC Draft Principleson the Allocation of
Loss in the Case of TransboundaryHarm Arising Out ofHazardousActivities: PrivatizingRisk, 14 REV.

EUR. COMP. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 265 (2005), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 1336329; Gou Haibo, ILCProposal
on the Rule of the Origin State in Transboundary Damage, in CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 108 (Michael G.

&

Faure & Song Ying, eds., 2008).
43 Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women Dec. 12/2007, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/44/D/12/2007, ¶¶ 9.3 n.6 & 10.2 (Aug. 4, 2009).
44 Hassan v. United Kingdom, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 87; Nat'l Union of Rail, Mar. & Transp.
Workers v. United Kingdom, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 2 (Wojtyczek, J., concurring); X & Others v. Austria,
2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 22 (Casadevall, J., Ziemele, J., Kovler, J., Jodiene, J., Sikuta, J., De Gaetano, J.
Sicilianos, J., jointly dissenting in part); Andrejeva v. Latvia, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 17, (Ziemele, J.,
dissenting in part).
45

JORUN BAUMGARTNER, TREATY SHOPPING IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 90 (2016);

JENNIFER E. FARRELL, THE INTERFACE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND TAXATION 213 (2013);

MCINERNEY-LANKFORD ET AL., supra note 35, at 24; Gear6id 6 Cuinn & Stephanie Switzer, Ebola and
the Airplane -Securing Mobility Through Regime Interactionsand Legal Adaptation, 32 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 71, 73 n.25, 76 n.52 (2019); Kal Raustiala, Institutional Prolferation and the InternationalLegal
Order, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

THE STATE OF THE ART 293, 311-12 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, eds., 2012).
46 For example, the Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of
Creating Legal Obligations have been cited in avariety of cases, scholarly writings, and policy documents.
E.g., Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Judgment, 2018 I.C.J. 153, ¶
141 (October 1); BENITO MOLLER ET AL., EUROPEAN CAPACITY BUILDING INITIATIVE, UNILATERAL
DECLARATIONS:

THE

MISSING

LEGAL

LINK

IN

THE

BALI

https://eurocapacity.org/downloads/Unilateral-DeclarationsEnglish

ACTION

PLAN

24

(2010),

May_2010.pdf; Mayer, supra note
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Audience

One inevitable implication of this widespread reliance is that the
audience for soft law is not solely states, but also other global legal and policy
actors. In assessing the purpose of the ILC's shift toward soft law, Jacob
Cogan concluded that the ILC was envisioning for itself an audience beyond
the member states of the UNGA, including the many different types of actors
that constitute the international community and that make decisions or take
actions relevant to the concerned legal standards.4 " This brief survey of
citations of the ILC's work lends credence to the claim that, whether the ILC
intended this result or not, it has in fact reached global legal actors that
include, but are not limited to, the political representatives of states in the
Sixth Committee. Significantly, while the ILC reports its soft law products
to the Sixth Committee and seeks its support for them, those soft law norms
do not require the approval of states to take effect in the way that hard law
norms do; rather, their legitimation and impact depend on their use by this
extended global legal community.
This conclusion also comports with theoretical and empirical models of
international law-making processes, which emphasize the significance of an
enormous variety of legal actors playing diverse roles in developing and
implementing international legal norms. Across various areas of international
law, scholars have argued that legal development does not necessarily
proceed top-down, from the international to the domestic, but rather, occurs
through iterative engagement among numerous actors at numerous levels;
likewise, legal development is not wholly state-centered, but may be driven
by interactions among peers in varied governmental, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and private settings. 4 9 By way of example, theories and studies
38, at 9 n.86; SuyashPaliwal, The Binding Force of G-20 Commitments, 40 YALE J. INT'L L. ONLINE 1,

7 n.30 (2014), https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/8/158I/files/2016/09/paliwalthe-binding-force-of-g-20-commitments-2hl zooz.pdf.
47 The findings discussed above are under-representative. The searches were not intended to be
comprehensive, and in addition, they include only those users who can be readily identified through
searches in online databases, thereby artificially excluding a variety of potential users including
government lawyers, bureaucrats, and NGOs.
48

Cogan, supra note 3, at 9.

49

E.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, DialecticalRegulation,38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 864-65 (2006); William

W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of InternationalCriminal Law Enforcement,
24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 24 (2002); Levit, supra note 25; Margaret E. McGuinness,Medellin, Norm Portals,
and the HorizontalIntegrationofInternationalHuman Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 773 (2006);
Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale ofNetworks? Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 409, 433-34 (2008); Melissa A. Waters, Normativity in the "New" Schools: Assessing the
Legitimacy ofInternationalLegal Norms Createdby Domestic Courts, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 455, 455-56
(2007). See generally MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK,
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).

ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:

1020

FIULaw Review

[Vol. 13:1007

of transnational networks and communities affirm their significance to legal
development through information-sharing, collaboration, and creation of
shared practices.o A study based in organizational theory highlights the roles
played by expert practitioners and institutional structures in enforcing
international legal norms." Transnational legal process theory emphasizes
the importance of internalization of norms into bureaucratic and domestic
systems. 5 2 Global legal pluralism highlights the legitimacy of processes and
practices developed at all levels of law, whether formal or informal, and by
all kinds of actors, whether official or unofficial, in contributing to the
formation of legal standards.53
It is important to emphasize, however, that this global legal acceptance
and implementation, while not dependent on prior formal ratification by
states, is nonetheless closely connected with state engagement and
acceptance. The ILC's choice of topics is often at the behest of states; it
regularly reports to and receives feedback from states in the the Sixth
Committee; it diligently researches the practice of states; and it consistently
seeks the support of the UNGA for its soft law outputs. It is impossible to
imagine that a set of norms promulgated by the ILC that met with widespread
state rejection would nonetheless be accepted and implemented by other legal
actors. Thus, it is not that other actors are displacing states as the ILC's soft
law audience, but rather, that other actors are joining states as that audience.

50 Adler, supra note 25; Elena Baylis, Function and Dysfunction in Post-ConflictJustice Networks
and Communities, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 625, 625 (2014) [hereinafter Baylis, Function and
Dysfunction]. See generallyElena Baylis, What InternationalsKnow: Improving the Effectiveness ofPostConflict Justice Initiatives, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 243 (2015); Kal Raustiala, The
Architecture ofInternationalCooperation: TransgovernmentalNetworks and the Future oflnternational
Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty andPower in a Networked World
Order, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283 (2004); Jenia lontcheva Turner, Transnational Networks and
InternationalCriminalJustice, 105 MICH. L. REV. 985 (2007).
51 Laura Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An EmpiricalAccount of International
Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-2 (2007).
52 Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 203-05 (1996).
53

Paul Schiff Berman, GlobalLegal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1155-56 (2007).

54 In considering whether to put forward the Draft Articles on State Responsibility for
Internationally Wrongful Acts for development as a treaty, the UNGA has asked not only for state input
but also for reports on courts and tribunals' use ofthe articles, suggesting that it recognizes the significance
of this broader audience in legitimizing the concerned norms. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility of
Statesfor InternationallyWrongfulActs, CompilationofDecisions oflnternationalCourts, Tribunals and

Other Bodies, U.N. Doc A/71/80, at 5 (2016). Further, as noted above, states are not unitary actors, and
soft law presents an opportunity for various actors within a state to engage with, assist in the development
or modification of, and implement norms, rather than having political representatives of states at the
UNGA be the sole gatekeepers for such norms. Id.
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IV. INFLUENCING A GLOBAL LEGAL AUDIENCE

A.

Key Factors

Several key characteristics have facilitated the ILC's influence on this
global legal audience. As noted in the first section of this essay, the ILC's
soft law documents enable legal actors to use customary and emerging legal
norms without undertaking the arduous process of researching and analyzing
different legal standards and practices; the ILC has done that work for them
and has issued clear statements of the current state of the law. In addition, the
ILC's work is widely accessible, as its final texts can be freely downloaded
from its website. The ILC also has a strong reputation as an expert body. Its
work processes, and in particular its careful consideration of numerous
sources and its engagement with states, are transparent in its reporting and
commentaries." The ILC itself has noted its mandate, its thorough research
process, and its active engagement with states and the UNGA as foundations
for its authority. 6 The significance of these characteristics of utility,
accessibility, expertise, comprehensive research and analysis, and reputation,
to an institution's influence are confirmed by studies of persuasive authority
in international and domestic courts. In brief, where those factors (among
others) are present, courts are more likely to accept and deploy legal norms
that they are not otherwise obligated to apply.
While the reasons that a decisionmaker, litigant, or scholar has chosen
to cite a particular authority are rarely made explicit, there are hints that some
of these characteristics have played a role in citations to the ILC's work.
Certainly, the most fundamental reason that legal actors are relying on the
ILC's soft law is that it is useful; these norms enable parties to a case to lend
support to their argument, assist a decision-maker in grappling with a

55

See generally Azaria, supra note 31.

56 In considering the weight that its work product should be given by decisionmakers, the ILC has
identified its sources, its stage of work, and states' responses as determining factors in assessing the
authority of particular documents. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary
International Law with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 22 (2018).
57 There have been several studies of the persuasive influence of certain international courts over
domestic courts; the relationship between these international and domestic courts is analogous to the
position of the ILC vis-a-vis global legal actors, because the studied international courts develop legal
norms but do not have authority over the concerned domestic courts to require them to adopt those norms.
Elena Baylis, The PersuasiveAuthority of Internationalized Criminal Tribunals, 32 AM. U. INT'L L.R.

611, 625-26, 631-32 (2017) [hereinafter Baylis, PersuasiveAuthority]; Laurence R. Helfer & Karen J.
Alter, The Andean Tribunal ofJustice and Its Interlocutors: UnderstandingPreliminaryReference Patters

in the Andean Community, 41 J. INT'L L. & POL. 871, 875-76 (2009); Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 300-06, 321-

22 (1997).
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contested legal issue, and provide fodder for scholarly analysis. In addition
to the implicit value placed on the ILC's expertise and systematic research
and analysis when legal actors cite to ILC sources as evidence of customary
law or legal norms, some citations to ILC soft law explicitly rely on the expert
discussion in the commentaries.' There are also indications that the ILC's
soft law audience accepts the varying degrees of authority that the proffered
norms possess and finds it useful to receive the ILC's statements even of
norms that do not necessarily rise to the level of customary law; some
citations treat the concerned principles or draft articles as authoritative
declarations of states' obligations, while others analyze their customary
nature or persuasive value.59
Finally, concerning accessibility, one mechanism by which legal norms
are circulated and put into use is through interconnections within
transnational networks and communities. 60 These are difficult to trace
through research into written documents, but even in the written resources,
there are hints of such connections. Two of the attorneys representing
Nicaragua in an ICJ case in which Nicaragua cited the ILC's Draft Articles
on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities were
former ILC chairs, for example.6
B.

Extending the ILC's Influence

In each of these areas, the ILC has processes in place that have served
to promote its work and extend its influence, as described above. But because
the ILC is an expert body of the Sixth Committee, its existing procedures
primarily orient it toward that Committee, toward the UNGA, and toward the
political representatives of states in those bodies as its primary audience.

58 E.g., Views Concerning Commc'n No. 4/2014, supra note 37, at ¶ 6.7; Views Concerming
Commc'n No. 14/2016, supra note 37, at 13 n.12.
59 E.g., Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) and
Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), Judgment, 2015
I.C.J. 665, at n.28-30 (Dec. 16) (separate opinion by Bhandari, J.); Anton, supra note 39, at 17-19. While
the ILC has not generally held itself out as an authority in its work product, it has done so in its
commentaries. For example, the text of the Draft Conclusions on Customary International Law itself does
not explicitly list the ILC as a source of evidence of customary law, but in the commentaries, the
Commission averred that "[t]he output of the International Law Commission itself merits special
consideration in the present context." Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 58, at 22. Similarly, in an interim
report on the ILC's progress on the topic of jus cogens, the chairperson stated that the Committee had
determined not to identify its work as evidence of ajus cogens norm in the draft conclusions, but instead,
to mention its role in the commentaries. Chairperson of the Drafting Committee of the Int'l Law Comm'n,
Peremptory Norms of General InternationalLaw (Jus Cogens), at 4 (2018).
60

61

Baylis, Function and Dysfunction, supra note 50, at 643.

Costa Rica v. Nicar. and Nicar. v. Costa Rica, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. at 672.
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While the Sixth Committee and the UNGA will always remain a
primary audience for the ILC, they are not its only audience. In particular, a
political process of approval by the Sixth Committee or the UNGA is not the
determinative factor for the fate of the ILC's soft law work; rather, that
depends on its diverse global audience, which includes but is not limited to
states. In addition, while state practice and interests are key aspects of the
information that the ILC needs to conduct its work, the practice and interests
of other global legal actors also contribute to the development of legal norms
and so are also important to the ILC's analysis.
Accordingly, just as communicating and engaging with the Sixth
Committee has been and will continue to be critical to the ILC's work, so
also, the ILC should proactively consult and connect to a greater extent with
its broader soft law audience. This could include more robust and systematic
engagement with tribunals, treaty bodies, courts, other UN entities,
international law organizations, NGOs, advocacy organizations, bureaucrats,
subject matter experts, and representatives of other concerned
organizations.6 2 Such engagement is contemplated by the Statute of the
International Law Commission, which authorizes the ILC to "consult with
any international or national organizations, official or non-official, on any
subject entrusted to it if it believes that such a procedure might aid it in the
performance of its functions "63 and to "consult with scientific institutions and
individual experts."6 It would also build upon the existing practice of the
ILC, which has undertaken such consultations from time to time.65
The first and most important step is to recognize this global audience
and consider how the ILC's processes might be adapted to better engage with
it, including in gathering information, designing outputs, and publicizing its
work. I offer some preliminary thoughts and examples below, but the ILC
itself is in the best position to assess how it could benefit from this broader
engagement and how its existing processes might most appropriately be
adapted.

62 The ILC does regularly meet with certain tribunals and codifying institutions, including "the
President of the International Court of Justice, the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International
Law of the Council of Europe, [and] the African Union Commission on International Law," among others.
More rarely, it consults with other entities, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. Int'l
Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, chapter I, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/72/10 (2017).
63 Statute of the International Law Commission, art. 26(i) (1947). In addition, consultation with
states, the UNGA, and other concerned UN organs is a mandatory part of the ILC's procedures under the
Statute. See id. at arts. 16-24.
64 Statute of the International Law Commission, art. 16(e) (1947).
65 See Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, chapter II, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc.
A/72/10 (2017).
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First, I would suggest that the ILC could consult systematically with a
variety of legal actors both in the process of selecting each topic and in
considering the existing legal practice and substantive norms for each
subject. Presently, this does not appear to be a regularized part of the ILC's
work, although it does carry out such discussions upon occasion.6 6 There
would be several benefits to such a process. The ILC would gain the
knowledge and practical expertise of the actors working in these areas. In
addition, participation in the development process is likely to encourage
those legal actors to make use of the eventual output. At a minimum, they
will be aware of the ILC's work on the subject. Legal actors who are involved
in the development of a norm are typically more likely to disseminate and
share that norm with others through informal networks and community
associations.
The ILC could also proactively publicize its work to a variety of legal
communities, institutions, and actors, in addition to making its work freely
available on its website. Just what kind of measures must be taken and how
extensive they must be to effectively reach a legal actor depends on the
context, and in particular on the resources of the intended audience. For some
audiences, translation into additional languages might make the ILC's work
more accessible; for audiences with limited internet access or research
capacity, affirmatively circulating key documents might facilitate
consideration and use. 69 The ILC could also raise the profile of new soft law

66

Int'l Law Comm'n, About the Commission: Relationshipswith Other Bodies, U.N. (January 11,

2019), http://legal.un.org/ilc/activs.shtml. In addition, reports from the U.N. Human Rights Committee
indicate meetings concerning the ILC's work on treaty reservations and interpretation of treaties. Rep. of
the HumanRights Comm., U.N. Doc. A/73/40, at 9 (2018); Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc.
A/66/40, vol. I, at 3 (2011). A 2010 study found that the ILC has consulted withNGOs only sporadically.
Steve Chamovitz, New Opportunities for Nongovermmental Actors in the International Law Commission
(2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the George Washington Univ. Law Sch.),
https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1443&context-facultypublications.
The
ILC's mandatory processes focus on states; the ILC's criteria for topic selection focus on ascertaining
state needs and state practice, not the interests and practice of other legal actors. Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep.
on the Work of Its Seventieth Session, ch. III, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 (2018).
67 It would also gain from diversifying its sources of input beyond what is possible from the
Commission members themselves. While the ILC has considerable geographic diversity in its
membership, its gender diversity remains limited, for example. Also, Chamovitz notes the benefits of
getting input from NGO actors to complement the typical govemmental and intergovernmental experience
at the ILC. Chamovitz, supra note 66.
68

Baylis, Function and Dysfunction, supra note 50, at 680; Daugirdas, supra note 4, at 82.

However, this is dependent on those consultations going well and being perceived by the participants to
be constructive; past consultations have apparently not always proceeded smoothly, so the separate
question of how to make those consultations functional from the perspective of all participants is also
important. Chamovitz, supra note 66, at 4.
69

Baylis, PersuasiveAuthority, supra note 57, at 626.
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documents with scholarly and practitioner communities by holding public or
online events when its work product is finalized.7 0
V.

CONCLUSION

The previous consensus of scholars who observed the ILC's transition
to a greater emphasis on soft law was that this change would expand the
ILC's audience and influence. This expectation has been bome out by the
widespread use of the ILC's soft law by courts, treaty bodies, and scholars,
as well as by states in their capacity as legal actors. Of course, the ILC has
continued to produce valuable hard law, such as its highly anticipated
forthcoming Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity, which are intended
to be developed into a convention. But by producing soft law as well as hard
law, the ILC is making effective use of its particular strengths and expertise.
The ILC's involvement increases the clarity and accessibility of international
law norms and promotes a dynamic, synergistic relationship between hard
law and soft law that contributes to the effective development of international
law.
In order to build on its existing soft law influence, the ILC should
acknowledge its vast global audience and tailor its processes and practices to
better reach this community. The global legal actors that constitute this
audience could contribute to the ILC's norm development process by
conveying their own experience and expertise. Likewise, the ILC will
enhance its credibility and gain new proponents by taking account of a
broader range of perspectives in its processes. The ILC could also develop
mechanisms to circulate its work to a variety of legal actors.
By its nature, soft law is intended to spark the development of
international law through iterative processes of practice and norm
consolidation. By leveraging this format, the ILC better serves its aims of
codifying and progressively developing international law.

70

Charnovitz, supra note 66, at 5.

